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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOUL AND SPIRIT  
IN GREEK AND LATIN PATRISTIC THOUGHT
Alexey R. Fokin
Some biblical texts suggest that man consists of two parts—body and soul—
whereas others seem to indicate instead three parts—body, soul, and spirit. 
This paper examines how the Church Fathers dealt with this apparent contra-
diction. It finds that although they generally favor the body-soul dichotomy, 
they did not see it as contradicting a trichotomous view, for “spirit” can be 
interpreted in a number of ways: as another term for the soul, or as the lowest 
imaginative part of the soul, or as its highest rational part, or as the grace of the 
Holy Spirit. Different approaches can be found in different patristic authors 
depending on their theological interests and the biblical passages at issue.
I
The structure of human nature became a subject of investigation for the 
first time among the Greek philosophers, who were interested not only in 
the nature of the relationship between the material body and immaterial 
soul and the interaction between them, but also in the internal structure 
of the soul. For example, there is Plato’s well-known division of the hu-
man soul into three parts or faculties, reason, passion, and desire (logikon, 
thymoeides, epithymētikon),1 and Aristotle’s division of the soul into three 
parts, rational, sensitive, and nutritive (dianoētikon, aisthētikon, threptikon).2 
Plato moreover distinguished two different elements in the rational part 
of the soul―namely the reason (logos) and the intellect (nous): the former 
is a faculty of discursive thinking or reasoning (dianoia), and the latter is 
a faculty of intuitive thinking or intellection (noēsis).3 Subsequently the 
Neoplatonists associated reason with the universal Soul, whose parts they 
considered the individual souls, and intellect with the universal Intellect, 
which emanates directly from the First Principle of the Universe and con-
tains in itself the so-called intelligible world (kosmos noētos).4
Aristotle also identifies a “passive intellect” (nous pathētikos), which is 
one of the cognitive faculties of the soul, usually dormant (when a man is 
focused only on the external sensible world), but awakens when the soul 
1Plato. Resp. 439 d 4–e 5; 440 e 3; Phaedr. 253 c–254 e.
2Aristoteles. De anima II 2, 413 b 10–15.
3Plato. Resp. 509 d 1–511 e 4; 533 e 7–534 a 8.
4Plotinus. Enn. V.1.2–7; V.2.1–2; V.3.2–17.
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tries to apprehend something immaterial. Aristotle posed the question as 
to what indeed wakes up this dormant passive intellect, coming to the con-
clusion that it must be a certain “active intellect” (nous poiētikos) which does 
not belong to the soul itself, but is an immortal, independent, and probably 
even divine substance. Thus there is some active entity in the human soul, 
which does not belong wholly to it, but is a part of the divine world.5
Similarly, the Stoics considered soul and mind (nous) as two different 
levels of organization of the so-called pneuma (spirit), which is a universal 
creative rational Principle. They regarded the human mind as the more 
fiery, intense, and divine pneuma, and the human soul as the more cold 
and less intense pneuma.6
II
Although the question of the structure of human nature and of its spiritual 
part first arose in Greek philosophy, it did not remain a purely philosophi-
cal question, but with the spread of the new world religion, Christian-
ity, it very soon acquired a theological dimension. In fact, in the Bible we 
can see different and even mutually contradictory descriptions of human 
beings. On the one hand, human beings are quite often identified only 
according to their physical part as “flesh.” For instance, in the book of 
Genesis God says: My Spirit does not strive in men forever, for they are flesh; 
and their days shall be one hundred twenty years (Gen 6:3).7 The apostle Paul 
in the Epistle to the Romans writes: Therefore by the deeds of the law no flesh 
(namely no man) will be justified in His (i.e., God’s) sight (Rom 3:20). On the 
other hand, human beings are also sometimes described only according 
to their spiritual part as “soul” (Hebrew neþeš, Greek psychē). For instance, 
in the book of Genesis it is said: The sons of Joseph who were born to him in 
Egypt were two souls. All the souls of the house of Jacob who went to Egypt 
were seventy (Gen 46:27). In the book of Acts we find: Then those who gladly 
received his word were baptized; and that day about three thousand souls were 
added to them (Act 2:41).
Finally, the Bible frequently mentions two principles of man, physical 
and spiritual, a doctrine subsequently in Christian theology called dichot-
omy. It is important to notice that in such passages the spiritual principle 
of man is sometimes called “soul” and sometimes “spirit” (Hebrew rûah, 
Greek pneuma). In fact, the book of Genesis in depicting the origin of man 
indicates his so-called double creation or the creation of the two parts of 
man: the physical part created from the ground, and the other spiritual 
part given to man directly from God by means of creative inspiration: And 
the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils 
the breath of life; and man became a living soul (Gen 2:7). Ecclesiastes in this 
5Aristoteles. De anima III 5, 430 a 14–25. 
6See Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta. I 135, 137–138; II 439–444, 458, 836–841. 
7Quotations from the Bible are based on the King James Version, with some modifica-
tions.
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way describes the death of man: Then the dust shall return to the earth as it 
was; and the spirit shall return to God who gave it (Eccl 12:7). In the Gospel the 
Lord Jesus says to the apostles: And you fear not them who kill the body, but 
are not able to kill the soul; but rather fear him who is able to destroy both soul 
and body in hell (Mt 10:28). The apostle Paul quite often uses dichotomic 
language, for instance, in the first Epistle to the Corinthians: The unmarried 
woman cares about the things of the Lord, that she may be holy both in body and 
in spirit (1 Cor 7:34).
From these and some other biblical passages8 it would appear that the 
soul and the spirit are two different names of the same spiritual part of 
human nature. But at the same time, in the Epistles of the apostle Paul we 
can find some passages in which the soul appears as something different 
from the spirit, and in the structure of human nature three parts are noted: 
body, soul, and spirit. This doctrine was subsequently called trichotomy. 
For example, in the first Epistle to the Thessalonians it is said: And the very 
God of peace sanctify you wholly; and let your whole spirit and soul and body be 
preserved blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ (1 Th 5:23). An-
other passage is found in the Epistle to the Hebrews9: For the word of God 
is quick, and powerful, and sharper than any two-edged sword, penetrating even 
to the division of soul and spirit, and of the joints and marrow, and is a discerner 
of the thoughts and intents of the heart (Heb 4:12). In addition, the apostle 
Paul divides people into three classes: “fleshly,” “psychic,” and “spiritual” 
(Rom 8:4–9; 1 Cor 2:14–15, 15:44–49).
Thus, reasoning from the biblical data, should we conclude that hu-
man beings consist of soul and spirit, or of body, soul, and spirit? Which 
doctrine is correct: dichotomy or trichotomy? In other words, should we 
think that soul and spirit are two different independent parts of man 
or even two different substances? Or should we think that one of them 
belongs to man, and the other does not, being a certain superior prin-
ciple? Perhaps they differ from one another in some other way? Perhaps 
there is no difference between them at all? These questions, originating 
from the biblical doctrine of human nature, became the subject of long 
discussions among Christian theologians, who tried to resolve them by 
means of philosophical methods and concepts already worked out in 
Greek philosophy.
We shall examine the answers given to these questions in the writings 
of Christian theologians of the Patristic period, known as the “golden 
age” of the christian Church. It is expedient to divide this large period 
into two parts: first, the Pre-Nicene period (till 325 A.D.), when the ques-
tion of human nature’s structure and of the relationship between soul and 
spirit had just arisen and Christian thinkers made their first attempts to 
resolve it; and second, the classical Patristic and early Medieval period 
8See, for instance, Jn 10:15, 17; 19:30; Lk 8:55; 23:46; Mt 27:50; Acts 20:10.
9Concerning the Epistle to the Hebrews, the authorship of the apostle Paul is disputed by 
modern western Biblical scholars but traditionally admitted by the Orthodox Church.
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(from the fourth to eighth centuries), when this question was finally 
resolved in the writings of the Church Fathers and the decisions of the 
Church Councils.
III
The first Christian theologians, the so-called Apostolic Fathers, simply 
quoted the related New Testament passages without any attempt to de-
fine what they mean. For instance, St. Ignatius of Antioch (also known as 
Ignatius Theophorus) simply lists the three parts of man: “Whom the Lord 
Jesus Christ will respect, in whom they hope by flesh, and soul, and spirit 
[in] faith, and love, and concord.”10 In one edition of the Epistle of St. Ig-
natius to Polycarp, bishop of Smyrna, soul and spirit are identified with 
each other and the biblical dichotomy is confirmed: “You consist of soul 
and body [as] fleshly and spiritual in order to improve what is evident 
personally to you, but ask for manifestation of the invisible to you.”11 In 
one of the anonymous homilies attributed to another apostolic Father, St. 
Clement of Rome, spirit is again identified with soul: “Universal and earthly 
soul . . . joins with a cognate spirit, which is the human soul.”12
The first attempts to posit a distinction between the human soul and 
spirit were undertaken by the Christian apologists; in so doing they used 
not only biblical material but also contemporary philosophical and even 
physiological doctrines. In the treatise “On Resurrection” sometimes at-
tributed to one of the first Greek apologists, St. Justin the Philosopher, we 
find the following: “The soul exists in the body, and it does not live in-
animate; you see that the body after it is left by the soul does not exist 
any more. For the body is a dwelling of soul, and the soul is a dwelling 
of the spirit. These three will be saved in those who have a firm hope and 
doubtless faith in God.”13 Nevertheless St. Justin in his other writings rec-
ognizes only two parts of man—soul and body.14 At the same time he dis-
tinguishes the soul which only participates in life from a certain “spirit of 
life” (to zōtikon pneuma) due to which it lives and which can be taken away 
from it by the will of God: “For to live is not an attribute of the soul, as it is 
God’s; but as a man does not live always, and the soul is not forever con-
joined with the body, since, whenever this harmony must be broken up, 
the soul leaves the body, and the man exists no longer; even so, whenever 
the soul must cease to exist, the spirit of life is removed from it, and there 
is no more soul, but it goes back to the place from whence it was taken.”15 
The spirit of life mentioned here for St. Justin is not identical to the Holy 
10Ign. Ant. Philad. 11.2; cf.: Pseudo-Just. De resurr. 10; Hipp. Comm. in Dan. II.38.5.
11Ign. Ant. Polyc. 2.2.
12Ps.-Clem. Hom. 9.12.4.
13Just. De resurr. // Corpus apologetarum Christianorum saeculi secundi. Vol. 3. P. 595A.
14Just. 1 Apol. 19.7; 2 Apol. 10.1; Dial. cum Tryph. 5–6.
15Just. Dial. cum Tryph. 6.
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Spirit, since it is inherent to all souls whereas the Holy Spirit joins only 
with righteous souls.16
The disciple of St. Justin, another Christian apologist, Tatian the Assyr-
ian, distinguished two kinds of spirit, the lowest “material spirit” (pneuma 
hylikon), also named soul, and the “the highest spirit” (to meizon pneuma) 
which existed in the first people but is today present only in holy men. 
Tatian calls the latter “the image and similitude of God” and “the Divine 
spirit” (to theion pneuma), evidently identifying it with the Holy Spirit.17 In 
a similar way another apologist, St. Theophilus of Antioch, makes a distinc-
tion between soul and the “spirit of God” (pneuma theou), which however 
he does not identify with the Holy Spirit, because God gave it to all crea-
tures just as He gave soul to all human beings. It is instead a spirit giving 
life to all living creatures and inhaled by men.18
One of the first representatives of the Alexandrian theological school, 
Clement of Alexandria, renders his own account of the relationship between 
soul and spirit. He distinguishes the rational soul (psychē logikē), which he 
also calls “the governing spirit” (to hēgemonikon pneuma), from the “corpo-
ral soul” (sōmatikē psychē), which he calls “the spiritual principle given in 
creation,” “the fleshly spirit,” “the unreasonable spirit,” “the subordinat-
ed spirit,” and the “vital force.”19 Each of these spirits has its own origin: 
the subordinated vital spirit is transmitted through the seed during the 
carnal conception of a man, and the governing rational spirit is given from 
heaven by God through the angels.20
Another well-known Alexandrian theologian, Origen of Alexandria, made 
an attempt to introduce into Christian theology his own philosophical doc-
trine on the pre-existence of souls. According to Origen, before the cre-
ation of the visible corporal world God had created the immaterial rational 
substances—pure spirits (pneumata), or pure intellects, some of whom after 
abandoning their love for God and spontaneously falling from Heaven be-
came souls (psychai), namely “cooled spirits,” which required various bod-
ies for their existence.21 However, as early as in the third century this doc-
trine was considered non-Christian and heretical because it distorted the 
biblical doctrine on the creation of man and reproduced pagan philosophi-
cal ideas.22 Despite his concept of soul as fallen spirit, Origen sometimes 
16Ibid. 5.
17See Tatian. Orat. ad Graec. 4, 12–13, 15, 20; cf. Orig. De princ. III.4.2.
18Theoph. Ad Autol. I.5, 7; II.13.
19Clem. Alex. Strom. VI.6.52; VI.16.134–135; VII.12.79; cf. Leont. Byz. Contra Nestorianos et 
Eutychianos I // PG T. 86. Col. 1296D–1297A.
20Clem. Alex. Strom. VI.16.135; IV.26.167; Eclog. prophet. 50.1–3; Quis div. salv. 33; ср. Hy-
potyp. // Phot. Biblioth. 109.
21Origen. De princ. I.7.4; I.8.1; I.8.4; II.3.1; II.8.3–4; II.9.6–7; III.5.4; Comm. in Jn. II.30.181–
182; XX.7 etc.
22See: Iren. Adv. haer. II.33.1–5; Tert. De anima, 4, 24; Hipp. Refut. VIII.10.1–2; Method. 
Olymp. De resurr. 2–3; Petrus Alexandr. Demonstratio quod anima corpori non praeexstiterit 
// PG. 18. Col. 520C–521A.
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regards the soul as “something middle” (quasi medium quoddam) between 
flesh and spirit and asserts that the human being consists of body, soul, 
and spirit.23 To this statement he connects his famous doctrine on the triple 
sense of the Holy Scriptures: just as a man consists of a body, soul, and 
spirit, so the Holy Scriptures have three senses: the lowest, firsthand and 
literal sense, the middle, psychical sense, and the highest, spiritual sense.24
The Gallic theologian, St. Irenaeus of Lyons, who is usually considered 
one of the main representatives of trichotomy, made an alternative distinc-
tion between soul and spirit. According to St. Irenaeus, “There are three 
things out of which the complete man is composed—flesh, soul, and spirit. 
One of these does indeed preserve and shape [the man]—this is the spirit; 
while to another it is united and formed—that is the flesh; then [comes] 
that which is between these two—that is the soul, which sometimes in-
deed, when it follows the spirit, is raised up by it, but sometimes sympa-
thizes with the flesh and falls into carnal lusts.25 In this case as in many 
others, St. Irenaeus identifies the spirit with the Spirit of God (Spiritus Dei) 
and the Spirit of the Father (Spiritus Patris), namely with the Holy Spirit 
who Himself is Life (vita),26 unlike the soul, which is only “the breath of 
life” (flatus vitae).
Another tendency is found in the writings of well-known Latin apolo-
gist Tertullian who in his treatise “On the Soul” for the first time tried to 
develop a full Christian doctrine on the soul.27 Although sometimes Tertul-
lian only reiterates biblical expressions concerning man’s trichotomy of 
body, soul, and spirit,28 in most cases he clearly teaches that “the human 
being consists of two substances (ex duabus substantiis), the body and the 
soul.”29 Moreover, in this treatise he unequivocally asserts the complete 
identity between soul and spirit, the latter being understood as a function 
of breathing inherent in the soul. He writes:
Some maintain that there is another natural substance [besides the soul], 
the spirit inherent to [man] (aliam substantiam naturalem inesse spiritum), as 
if to have life (vivere)—the function which comes from the soul (ab anima)—
were one thing, and to emit breath (spirare)—the function which comes from 
the spirit (a spiritu)—were another thing. Now it is not in all animals that 
these two functions are found, for there are many which only live but do not 
breathe in that they do not possess the organs of respiration, that is, lungs 
and windpipes. . . . Man, indeed, although organically furnished with lungs 
and windpipes, will not on that account be proved to breathe by one pro-
23Idem. De princ. II.8.4; III.4.1–3; IV.2.4; Dial. Heracl. 3; Comm. in Matth. XVII.27; Comm. 
in Joann. XXXII.2.
24Idem. De princ. IV.2.4–5. Sometimes Origen regards the spirit as the highest part of the 
soul, which is mind. See: Idem. Philocalia 12.1; Com. in Ep. ad Ephes. 19 etc.
25Iren. Adv. haer. V.9.1.
26Idem. Adv. haer. V.6.1; V.7.1; V.9.1–4 и др.
27Tert. De anima 22.
28Idem. Contr. Marc. V.15.
29Idem. IV. 37; cp. De resurr. carn. 34; Scorp. 9; De paenit. 3.
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cess, and to live by another. . . . For to live is to breathe, and to breathe is to 
live (vivere spirare est et spirare vivere est). Therefore this entire process, both 
of breathing and living, belongs to that to which living belongs—that is, to 
the soul. Well, then, since you separate the spirit [from the soul], separate 
their operations also. Let each of them accomplish some act apart from the 
other—the soul apart, the spirit apart. Let the soul live without the spirit; 
let the spirit breathe without the soul. Let one of them quit the body, let the 
other remain; let death and life meet and agree. If indeed the soul and the 
spirit are two, they may be divided; and thus, by the separation of the one 
which departs from the one which remains, there would accrue the union 
and meeting together of life and of death. But such a union never will hap-
pen; therefore they are not two, and they cannot be divided; but divided they 
might have been, if they had been two. . . . How much firmer ground you 
have for believing that the soul and the spirit are but one, since you assign to 
them no difference; so that the soul is itself the spirit (ipsa sit anima spiritus), 
respiration being the function of that of which life also is!30
Apart from the main stream of the theological tradition of the Church 
there were the various Gnostic systems of the first two centuries A.D. In many 
cases they identified soul with spirit or considered it as an emanation (apor-
roia) or seed (sperma) of a certain divine aeon, or Demiurge, or the lowest 
angels.31 For instance, the Gnostic Valentinus and his followers believed that 
the body of man (“earthly man”) was created by an evil Demiurge from 
worldly matter, the soul (“psychical man”) originated from the inspiration 
of the psychical substance of the same Demiurge, and the spirit (“spiritual 
man”) was an emanation of the spiritual substance of the lowest aeon of 
the divine Plenitude, the so called Sophia-Hachamoth.32 Another Gnostic, 
Saturninus, thought that the body of man was created by certain angels 
but received a vivificating soul from the highest Power as “a spark of life” 
(scintilla vitae) consubstantial with this Power.33 The Gnostic Basilides and 
his disciple Isidorus believed that human beings have two different souls, 
one good and the other evil, and also many spirits34―a thesis subsequently 
reiterated by the Manicheans. However, all these strange doctrines contra-
dicted the Bible in many ways and were in fact religious and philosophical 
myths, so that they were very soon refuted by such outstanding Christian 
theologians as St. Irenaeus of Lyons, St. Clement of Alexandria, and St. Hip-
polytus of Rome, and also subsequently rejected by the christian Church.
IV
On the basis laid down in the Pre-Nicene period, Christian theologians of 
the classical Patristic and early Medieval period succeeded in giving clear 
30Idem. De anima. 10.
31See: Iren. Adv. Haer. I.5.5–6; I.7.3; I.24.1, 4; I.25.1; I.26.1; II.19.7; Tert. Adv. Valent. 24–29; 
Clem. Alex. Exc. ex Theod. III.50.2–3.
32See: Iren. Adv. Haer. I.5.5–6; Tert. Adv. Valent. 24–25.
33See: Iren. Adv. Haer. I.24.1.
34See: Clem. Alex. Strom. II.20.113–114; ср. Orig. De princ. III.4.1–2.
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and definite solutions to the question concerning the structure of human 
nature and relationship between soul and spirit.
First of all we see that all authoritative Church theologians in their dog-
matic statements strictly upheld the dichotomy and unanimously taught 
that human beings consist of two different parts, principles or substanc-
es—of soul and body. In so doing they recognized in man only one spiri-
tual principle and did not regard soul and spirit as two independent spiri-
tual principles or substances.35 Indeed, according to the definition of St. 
Gregory of Nyssa, “he who consists of intelligent soul and body (ek psychēs 
noeras kai sōmatos) is called man.”36 St. Gregory calls these two parts fol-
lowing St. Paul “the outer and the inner man,”37 or following the apostle 
Peter “the visible and the hidden man.”38 St. Augustine of Hippo expresses 
a similar opinion: “Man is not a body alone, nor a soul alone, but a being 
composed of both. It is indeed true, that the soul is not the whole man, 
but the better part of man; the body not the whole, but the inferior part of 
man; and that then, when both are joined, they receive the name of man.”39 
Similarly John the Grammarian, presbyter of Caesarea, writes: “Everything 
that is equally observed in many and does not exist more in one and less in 
the other, is called essence. As every individual man is indifferently flesh 
animated by the rational soul, and this is humanity, accordingly we call 
humanity one essence although it is a sign of the two essences.”40
At the same time it is important to notice that this dichotomy was not 
simply a product of abstract theoretical conclusions, but from the very 
35In the Eastern Church this opinion was maintained by St. Аthanasius the Great (Contra 
Gentes 3, 30, 32–33; De incarn. 17.3; Tomus ad Antioch. 7); St. Basil the Great (Hom. 3.7 // S.Y. 
Rudberg, 1962. P. 35.17–18; Hom. Ps. 32 // PG. 29. Col. 337D); St. Gregory of Nazianzus (Or. 
40.8; Ep. 101.19; Carm. moral. 10.111–114 // PG. 37. Col. 688A); St. Gregory of Nyssa (Or. Cat. 
6.34–42; 37.1–2; De op. hom. 29; Adv. Apoll. // GNO. III.1. P. 133.25–30; 185.15–21; De or. Dom. 
IV // Oehler. S. 274.25–276.6; De an. et res. // PG. 46. Col. 69D–72А); St. Cyril of Jerusalem (Cyr. 
Hier. Catech. 3.4; 4.18); St. John Chrysostom (In Gen. Hom. 13.2; 21.6); St. Cyril of Alexandria 
(Com. in Joann. II.1 // Vol. 1. P. 219; Com. in Malach. II // Vol. 2. P. 596; De incarn Unigen. // P. 
679); St. Theodoret of Cyrus (Quaest. in Gen. 23; Haer. fab. comp. V.9; Eranist. // P. 112–113); St. 
Leontius of Byzantium (Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos I // PG T. 86. Col. 1281AB, 1296C); 
St. Maximusus the Confessor (Amb. 2 (7) // PG. 91. Col. 1092B; Amb. 35 // Col. 1153A; Quaest. 
ad Thalas. 33.26; 43.33–34; Mystag. 5.1–2); St. John of Damascus (Exp. fidei II.12 (26); IV.9 (82); 
Contr. Jacob. 56.1–2; De nat. composit. 7.6–8); St. Photius of Constantinople (Amphil. Qu. 73 // 
PG. 101. Col. 453A; Qu. 230 // Col. 1292А; Com. in Matth. Fr. 25) etc.; in the Western Church 
by St. Hilary of Poitiers (Tr. in Ps. 129.4–6; De Trinit. X.19; X.57); St. Ambrose of Milan (De 
Abraham I.4.29; Expositio Euang. sec. Lucam II.79; De inst. virg. III.17); St. Jerome (Com. in 
Zachar. 12.1; Tract. in psalm. 127 // PL. 26. Col. 1291C; Dial. contr. Pelag. III.11); St. Augustine 
(De beata vita 2; De quantit. anim. 1.2; De divers. quaest. 7; Confess. X.6.9; De Genesi ad litt. 
VI.11); St. John Cassian (Cassian. Coll. 4.10); St. Vincent of Lérins (Commonit. 13); Gennadius of 
Marseille (De eccl. dogm. 14–16); St. Gregory the Great (Moralia XVIII.18; XXXV.16); St. Isidore 
of Seville (De differen. rer. 46); St. Bede the Venerable (In Lucae Euang. Exp. IV.12) etc.
36Greg. Nyss. Adv. Apoll. // GNO. III.1. P. 133.25–30; ср. Ibid. P. 185.9–26; Or. Cat., 6.34–42; 
De or. Dom., IV // Oehler. S. 274.25–276.6; De an. et res. // PG 46. Col. 69D–72А.
37Idem. Adv. Apoll. // GNO. III.1. P. 185.15–21.
38Idem. De op. hom. 29; De an. et res. // PG 46. Col. 72D.
39August. De civitate Dei XIII.24; cf. Ep. 238.2 etc.
40Joann. Gramm. Apol. concil. Chalced. 1.
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beginning was closely connected with Christian soteriology and ascet-
icism. In fact, St. Gregory the Theologian in his famous sermon on holy 
Baptism says, “Since we are double-made, I mean [we consist] of body 
and soul, and of the visible and invisible natures, so the cleansing [in the 
baptism] also is twofold, by water and the Spirit; the one received visibly 
in the body, the other concurring with it invisibly and apart from the 
body; the one typical, the other real and cleansing the depths.”41 St. John 
Chrysostom, commenting on the story from the book of Genesis concern-
ing the creation of man, says: “Tell me whether we do not consist of two 
substances (apo dyo ousiōn), that is, of soul and body? Why then do we 
take unequal care of the former and the latter, trying in every possible 
way to please the body . . . while neglecting care of the soul?»42
The dichotomy is even more evident in the Christological doctrine of 
the Church produced during the long Christological disputes of the V–VII 
centuries. Indeed, when they are talking about the completeness of the 
human nature of Jesus Christ, the incarnated God the Word, practically all 
orthodox polemicists of that age agree that He consists of “flesh, animated 
by both a rational and an intelligent soul” (sarx epsychōmenē psychē logikē 
kai noera), namely a soul possessing reason (logos) and intellect (nous).43 For 
instance, the outstanding Byzantine philosopher and theologian St. Maxi-
mus the Confessor says that God the Word “by Himself became man, that 
is, took flesh possessing both an intelligent and rational soul.”44 Another 
famous Byzantine theologian, St. John of Damascus, in his treatise An Exact 
Exposition of the Orthodox Faith, which is considered a summa of orthodox 
patristic theology and which became a prototype of the well-known me-
dieval Libri Sententiarum, writes as follows:
God the Word omitted none of the things which He implanted in our na-
ture when He formed us in the beginning, but took them all upon Himself, 
body and soul both intelligent and rational, and all their properties. For the 
creature that is devoid of one of these [properties] is not man. But God the 
Word in His fullness took upon Himself [man] in his fullness, and was unit-
ed whole to whole that He might in His grace bestow salvation on the whole 
man. For what has not been assumed cannot be healed.45
In the no less authoritative doctrinal treatise, Doctrine of the Fathers on 
the Incarnation of the Word, written in the seventh century by an anonymous 
41Greg. Naz. Or. 40.8. Ср. Cyril. Hier. Catech. ad illum. 3.4; Joann. Damasc. Exp. fidei II.11 
(25); IV.9 (82).
42Joann. Chrysost. In Gen. Hom. 21.6.
43Didym. Caec. Fragm. in Ps. Fr. 215; Cyr. Alex. Ep. ad Nestor. // ACO Vol. I.1.1. P. 26; De 
sancta Trinit. // PG. 77. Col. 1141; Justinian. Edict. rectae fidei // P. 132, 144, 148; Joann. Gramm. 
Apol. concil. Chalced. 1; Cap. contr. monophys. 1; Maximus. Confess. Quaest. ad Thalas. 20, 
42, 63; Joann. Damasc. Exp. fidei III.6 (50); De duabus in Christo voluntatibus, 9; Contr. Jacob. 
68; Or. de imag. I.1.16; Doctrina Patrum // P. 70–71.
44Maximus. Confess. Quaest. ad Thalas. 20.
45Joann. Damasc. Exp. fidei III.6 (50). See also: De duabus in Christo volunt., 9; Contr. Ja-
cob. 68; Or. de imag. I.1.16 etc.
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author (presumably by St. Anastasius the Sinaite), we similarly read: 
“Christ has taken not a part of human essence, such as only flesh without 
rational soul, as Apollinaris says, but the entire human essence, that is, 
flesh animated by both rational and intelligent soul. For only this essence, 
which perfectly belongs to every individual man, should be rightly called 
[human] essence.”46
Thus we can see that Christian theologians of the classical Patristic pe-
riod strictly upheld the dichotomy, believing that human nature consists 
of two principles, soul and body, and not of three or more principles. But 
how did they understand human spirit, which is frequently mentioned in 
the Bible and in the writings of previous theologians? And what in that 
case did they think about the unity of the spiritual principle of man?
In resolving these problems and defining the spirit in human nature, 
Christian theologians quite often pointed out that in the Bible the term 
‘spirit’ has many different meanings. Indeed spirit in connection with 
human beings is frequently considered a synonym of soul and identi-
fied with it.47 For instance, St. Cyril of Jerusalem in his famous Catecheti-
cal Homilies remarks that “the name of spirit is given to different things 
. . . For many things are called spirits. Thus an angel is called a spirit, 
our soul is called a spirit, and this wind which is blowing is called a 
spirit; great virtue also is spoken of as spirit; and impure practice is 
called spirit; and the devil our adversary is called spirit. Beware there-
fore when you hear these things, lest from their having a common name 
you mistake one for another. For concerning our soul the Scripture says: 
His spirit shall go forth, and he shall return to his earth (Ps 145:4); and of 
the same soul it says again: Who formed the spirit of man within him (Zec 
12:1).»48 The same point is made by St. Augustine in his Commentaries 
on the book of Genesis,49 by St. Аnastasius the Sinaite in his “Hodegos” 
(“Guidebook”),50 and by St. John of Damascus in his Exact Exposition of 
the Orthodox Faith.51 Gennadius of Marseille in his treatise “On the Doc-
trines of the Church,” reiterating Tertullian’s opinion quoted above, 
writes: “Spirit is not something third in the substance of man, as asserts 
Didymus, but it is the soul [so named] because of its spiritual nature (pro 
46Doctrina Patrum // P. 70–71.
47See: Cyr. Hier. Catech. 16.13; Greg. Naz. Or. 2.17; 38.11; 45.7; Serap. Thmuit. Eucholog. 30.2; 
Didym. De Trin. 2.20 // PG. 39. Col. 736A; Olymp. Alex. Com. in Eccl. 4.12 // PG. 93. Col. 492A; 
Anastas. Sinait. Viae dux, II.2.2 // PG. 89. Col. 56B; De definit. I.6 // PG. 28. Col. 536D; Joann. 
Damasc. Exp. fidei I.13; II.12 (26); Hilar. Pictav. Tr. in Ps. 129.4; Hieronym. Com. in Zachar. 
12.1; Com. in Euang. Matth. IV.27.54; August. De Genesi ad litt. VII.28; XII.7; De natura et 
orig. anim. II.2.2; Cassian. Coll. 7.13; Gennad. Massil. De eccl. dogm. 20; Isidor. Hispal. Etymol. 
XI.1.13; Alcuin. De ratione anim. 10 etc.
48Cyr. Hier. Catech. 16.13.
49August. De Gen. ad litt. XII.7.
50Anastas. Sinait. Viae dux, II.2.2 // PG. 89. Col. 56B; De definit. I.6 // PG. 28. Col. 536D.
51Anastas. Sinait. Viae dux, II.2.2 // PG. 89. Col. 56B; De definit. I.6 // PG. 28. Col. 536D; 
Joann. Damasc. Exp. fidei I.13.
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spiritali natura), or it is named spirit because it performs respiration in 
the body (spiret in corpore).”52
Christian ascetics also confirm this statement concerning the identity of 
soul and spirit. For instance, St. John Cassian observes: “For even if spirit is 
mingled with this crass and solid matter, namely flesh (as very easily hap-
pens), should we therefore believe that it can be united with soul, which 
is in like manner spirit, in such a way as to make it also receptive in the 
same way of its own nature: a thing which is possible to the [Holy] Trin-
ity alone?”53 Some authoritative theologians, such as St. John Chrysostom 
and St. Cyril of Alexandria54 also identify soul and spirit in commenting 
on the passage of the apostle Paul’s Epistle to Hebrews where a distinc-
tion is found between them (Heb 4:12). Instead of the original reading, 
(the word of God) is penetrating even to the division of soul and spirit, they 
sometimes read (the word of God) is penetrating even to the division of soul 
and body, which better corresponds to the universally accepted dichotomy. 
Those who quoted these words of the apostle Paul in their original form 
often understood them in the sense of the various conditions, actions, or 
parts of the human soul. For instance, St. Маximus the Confessor explains 
the words of the apostle Paul as follows: “Passing through all things, the 
powerful and living Word [of God] also penetrates the division of soul and 
spirit, that is, distinguishes which of [men’s] acts or thoughts are psychical 
(psychika), namely natural kinds or movements of virtue, and which are 
spiritual (pneumatika), namely supernatural kinds proper only for God, 
but given to [human] nature by [Divine] grace.”55 St. Cyril of Alexandria 
also remarks that the apostle’s words can be understood in this way: “The 
word of God distinguishes and divides parts of the soul (ta tēs psychēs 
merē), making it able to comprehend and to understand what it hears.”56
Another opinion also widespread among Christian theologians was the 
identification of spirit with the highest part of the human soul, namely the 
mind or intellect (nous, mens, intellectus).57 Indeed, St. John of Damascus 
52Gennad. Massil. De eccl. dogm. 20.
53Cassian. Coll. 7.13.
54See: Joann. Chrysost. Ad Stagirium I.9; Cyr. Alex. De St. Trinit. I // SChr. N 231. P. 398.
55Maximus. Confess. Quaest. ad Thalas. 56.122–128; сf.: Theodoret. Interp. in Ep. s. Pauli ad 
Hebr. 4.12–13 // PG. 82. Col. 705; Cyr. Alex. Com. in Joann. // Vol. 2. P. 554.
56Cyr. Alex. In s. Pauli Ep. ad Hebr. // Pusey. 1872. P. 405.
57See: Athanas. Magn. Contra Gentes 30; Basil. Magn. Hom. 21 // PG. 31. Col. 549A; Greg. 
Nyss. Adv. Apoll. // GNO. III.1. P. 172.23–30; P. 185.9–26; In Cant. II // GNO. VI. P. 45.1–2; 
VII // GNO. VI. P. 242.8–9; V. Moys. II.215; De op. hom. 12; De virg. V.1.30–31; Olymp. Alex. 
Com. in Eccl. 4.12 // PG. 93. Col. 532C; Anastas. Sinait. Serm. in constit. hom. 1.3 // PG. 44. 
Col. 1333BC; Viae dux, II.2.2 // PG. 89. Col. 56B; Maximus. Confess. Amb. 10/2 // PG. 91. Col. 
1112B; 10/3 // Col. 1116A; 15 // Col. 1220A; 21 // Col. 1248B; Joann. Damasc. Exp. fidei I.13; 
August. De Gen. ad litt. XII 7; De Trinit. XIV 16; De fide et symb. 10; Ep. 238.2. Despite such 
unanimous consent of the authoritative Christian theologians, there were some objections to 
the identification of human mind and spirit. Thus St. Epiphanius of Cyprus raised objections 
in his treatise “Аncoratus” (Epiph. Ancor. 77.3). Yet his intention was not so much to establish 
a distinction between mind and spirit as to show that both human mind and spirit are not 
independent hypostases, being inseparable from human soul. So if Christ took upon Himself 
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listing various meanings of the word ‘spirit’ in the Bible says, “Sometimes 
the mind is also called spirit.”58 St. Augustine in his Commentaries on the 
book of Genesis explains this opinion in detail:
Rational mind itself (ipsa mens rationalis) is called spirit (spiritus), which has 
a kind of eye of the soul (oculus animae), possessing an image of God and 
knowledge of God. Therefore the apostle says: be renewed in the spirit of your 
mind (spiritu mentis vestrae), and put on the new man, which is created according 
to God (Eph 4:23–24). And in the other place he speaks about the inner man: 
Which is renewed in knowledge according to the image of Him Who created him 
(Col 3:10). And again after he has said: So then with the mind I myself serve the 
law of God; but with the flesh ― the law of sin (Rom 7:25), in the other passage 
he also remembers this statement: Flesh lusts against the spirit (spiritum), and 
the spirit against the flesh . . . so that you cannot do the things that you would (Gal 
5:17). What in the first case he has called mind (mentem), in the second case 
he has called also spirit (spiritum).59
It should be noted, however, that Augustine also adds another possible 
meaning in his treatise On the Trinity: “And we speak also of a spirit in 
man distinct from the mind, to which spirit belong the images that are 
formed after the likeness of bodies”60; and in another passage he explains: 
“Spirit also is a certain faculty of the soul, which is lower than the mind 
(vis animae quaedam mente inferior), where the similitudes of corporal things 
are impressed.”61 The identity of spirit and intellect is again found in St. 
Gregory of Nyssa, who remarks that “in Holy Scripture the governing 
principle [of man] (to hēgemonikon) is called by three [names], intellect, or 
spirit, or heart, [for it says]: Create in me a clean heart, O God (Ps 50:12); and 
a man with intellect shall attain unto government (Prov 1:5; LXX); and Nobody 
knows the things of a man, except the spirit of man which is in him (1 Cor 2:11).62 
St. Gregory draws upon Aristotle’s division of the soul into three parts63 to 
reconcile the dichotomy of body and soul with the trichotomy of the apos-
tle Paul, explaining that the apostle “called the nutritive part [of the soul] 
the body, the sensitive part the soul, and the rational part the spirit.”64 Fi-
nally St. Anastasius the Sinaite in his “Sermon concerning the Creation of 
Man according to the Image and Similitude of God” makes the following 
analogy between the structure of the inner man and the Holy Trinity: just 
as in the Holy Trinity there is unbegotten and causeless God the Father, 
and the Word (Logos) begotten from Him, and the Spirit (Pneuma) proceed-
ing from Him, so in us “there is our soul (psychē) and its intelligent word 
a human soul, He also took a human mind, which was denied by the heresiarch Аpollinaris 
of Laodicea (ibid.).
58Joann. Damasc. Exp. fidei I.13. Ср. Anastas. Sinait. Viae dux, II.2.2 // PG. 89. Col. 56B.
59August. De Gen. ad litt. XII 7; cf. De Trinit. XIV 16.
60Idem. De Trinit. XIV 16.
61Idem. De Gen. ad litt. XII 9; cf. Ps.-August. De spiritu et anima 10 // PL. T. 40. Col. 785.
62Greg. Nyss. Adv. Apoll. // GNO. III.1. P. 172.24–28.
63Idem. De op. hom. 8; 14; De an. et res. // PG. 46. Col. 53B; 60ВС; 128А etc.
64Idem. De op. hom. 8.
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(noeros logos) and its mind (nous), which the apostle called ‘spirit,’ when he 
ordered us to be holy in soul, body, and spirit.65 For the soul is unbegotten 
and causeless according to the image of the causeless God the Father; and 
its intelligent word is not unbegotten but ineffably, invisibly, inexplicably, 
and passionlessly begotten from it; and the mind is neither causeless, nor 
unbegotten, but proceeding, and everywhere penetrating, and observing 
and invisibly touching all according to the image and similitude of the 
most Holy and proceeding Spirit [of God].”66
Nonetheless, there was one passage in which the Church Fathers found 
at least an apparent distinction between the spirit and the mind, the words 
of the apostle Paul: I will pray with the spirit, and I will pray with the mind: I 
will sing with the spirit, and I will sing with the mind (1 Co 14:15). St. Maxi-
mus the Confessor understands these words as follows: “Someone sings 
with the spirit when he utters by tongue the words of singing, and sings 
with the mind when he understands the power of those words which 
are sung.”67 St. John Chrysostom explains them somewhat differently: 
“Wherefore [the apostle Paul] also said, ‘If I pray with the tongue, only 
my spirit prays,’ namely the [Divine] gift which is given me (to charisma to 
dothen moi) and which moves my tongue; ‘but my mind is unfruitful.’”68
It was in accordance with the latter opinion that many authoritative 
Christian theologians also developed the view, already pointed out in the 
apologists and St. Irenaeus of Lyons, that “spirit” sometimes can mean a 
certain supernatural condition of the human soul, when it aspires com-
pletely toward God and is filled with the grace of the Holy Spirit.69 Besides 
the words of St. John Chrysostom quoted above, we find this opinion in 
the writings of the famous ascetic teacher St. Маcarius of Egypt, who says 
in his Spiritual Homilies: “The soul perfectly enlightened by the ineffable 
beauty of the glory of the light of the Face of Christ and perfectly com-
municated with the Holy Spirit and honored to become a dwelling and 
a throne of God, itself becomes wholly eye, and wholly light, and wholly 
face, and wholly glory, and wholly becomes spirit.»70 We also find an exact 
doctrinal definition of this opinion in the treatise of Gennadius of Mar-
seille, “On the doctrines of the Church”: “Spirit, which is mentioned by 
the apostle as the third alongside soul and body, is grace of the Holy Spirit 
(gratia Spiritus Sancti).”71
65Cf. 1 Co 7:34. The original words are: in body and in spirit.
66Anastas. Sinait. Serm. in constit. hom. 1.3 // PG. 44. Col. 1333BC. Сf. Greg. Nyss. Or. Cat. 
1–2.
67Maximus. Confess. Quaest. et dub. 1.2.
68Joann. Chrysost. In Ep. I ad Cor. Hom. 35.4.
69See: Macar. Aegypt. Hom. 1.2 // PG. 34. Col. 452В; Gennad. Massil. De eccl. dogm. 20; 
Olymp. Alex. Com. in Eccl. 4.12 // PG. 93. Col. 532C; Maximus. Confess. Quaest. ad Thalas. 
56.122–128 etc.
70See: Macar. Aegypt. Hom. 1.2 (Coll. H) // PG. 34. Col. 452В.
71Gennad. Massil. De eccl. dogm. 20.
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Nonetheless, only a few among Christian theologians of the classical 
Patristic period distinguished between soul and spirit as between two 
independent principles or substances. Among them are heresiarch Apol-
linaris of Laodicea and the Origenist Didymus the Blind, who taught that 
man consists of three different substances: body, animal soul, and rational 
soul or spirit.72 Their contemporary, the Latin Christian philosopher and 
theologian Marius Victorinus, supposed that man has two souls: one is “di-
vine,” possessing the intellect (anima divinior cum suo nōi), and the other 
is material, possessing sensible and vital forces (potentia sensibilis); like 
Clement of Alexandria, Victorinus believed that each of these souls has its 
own origin.73 The Manicheans maintained an opinion similar to that of the 
Gnostics, namely that there are two kinds of the human souls—good and 
evil.74 Refuting some of these views, St. Theodoret of Cyrus wrote: “Apol-
linaris of Laodicea says that man consists of three [parts]: body, animal 
soul, and rational soul, which he calls mind. But the Divine Scriptures 
recognize only one and not two souls, as they clearly teach [in the his-
tory] of the creation of the first man.”75 A similar objection we can find 
in the treatise of Gennadius of Marseille mentioned above: “We do not 
say that there are two souls in man, as Jacob and other Syrian disputants 
write, one psychical (animalis) which animates the body and is mixed with 
blood, and the other spiritual (spiritalis) governing the reason. But we say 
there is one and the same soul in man, which vivifies the body by union 
with it and disposes itself by its reason, having in itself free will to select 
by reasoning what it wants.”76 Finally we can find a complete definition of 
the Church theologians’ opinion concerning the relationship between soul 
and spirit in the writings of Olympiodorus, a lesser-known Alexandrian 
exegete who lived at the end of the sixth and beginning of the seventh 
century. He writes:
It is said, that man consists of three [parts]—soul, body, and spirit—never-
theless the spirit is not something other by its substance than the soul; for 
there are not in man two rational principles, but we say that the spirit differs 
from the soul only in conception (kat’ epinoian), and we call spirit the easily-
movable and highest [part] of the soul. And I think it is the mind (nous). Or 
the spirit is a spiritual grace (pneumatikon charisma), enlightening and illumi-
nating our souls.77
The question of the unity of the soul also became a subject of special 
discussion at the Fourth Constantinopolitan Council of 869/870 A.D. (also 
known as the Eighth Ecumenical Council). Its eleventh canon defines: 
72See: Greg. Nyss. Adv. Apoll. // GNO. III.1. P. 185.10–12; Theodoret. Eranist. // P. 112; Didym. 
De Sp. St. 54, 55, 59; De Trin. 1.9; 1.15; 3.31; Gennad. Massil. De eccl. dogm. 20.
73Mar. Vict. Adv. Ar., I.62. 11–14; 26–37.
74See: August. De duab. anim. adv. Manich. 1.1; 13.19 etc.; сf. Nemes. De nat. hom. 2.
75Theodoret. Eranist. // Ed. G.H. Ettlinger. Oxford, 1975. P. 112–113.
76Gennad. Massil. De eccl. dogm. 15.
77Olymp. Alex. Com. in Eccl. 4.12 // PG. 93. Col. 532C; cf. Com. in Job 12.9–10.
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“Though the Old and New Testament teach that man possesses one both 
rational and intelligent soul (unam animam rationabilem et intelligentem), and 
all divinely inspired Fathers and Teachers of the Church confirm the same 
doctrine, some people thinking out pernicious fables have reached such a 
degree of impiety that they shamelessly teach that man has two souls.”78
V
In conclusion, let us summarize the basic principles of the doctrine con-
cerning the structure of human nature and the relationship between soul 
and spirit which was developed by Greek and Latin patristic theologians.
Firstly, the basis of this doctrine is biblical anthropology and its particu-
lar manner of describing the human being as a body (flesh), or a soul, or 
a union of body and soul, or a union of body, soul, and spirit. At the same 
time this biblical doctrine in patristic thought was completed and devel-
oped by means of philosophical methods and concepts already worked 
out in Greek philosophy.
Secondly, it was clearly defined that man consists only of two different 
principles or substances: soul and body. In this connection the prevailing 
theory was dichotomy (as in Plato and Aristotle), in spite of some trichoto-
mic expressions.
Thirdly, there is in man only one spiritual and rational principle, name-
ly soul possessing many parts or faculties; thus spirit differs from the soul 
only in conception, and not in fact.
Fourthly, as a result of the comparative analysis of a considerable num-
ber of sources it was established, that the term ‘spirit’ applied to human 
nature has at least four different meanings:
(1) first, the soul itself, called spirit because of its spiritual nature or 
because of its function of breathing;
(2)  second, the lower part of the soul, in which the similitudes of cor-
poral things are impressed (namely, the faculty of imagination or 
imprinting);
(3)  third, the highest rational part of the soul, namely mind (intellect) or 
heart (rarely);
(4)  fourth, the Holy Spirit or His grace which may be acquired by the 
holy soul.
All these meanings, used by Christian theologians, have their parallels in 
Greek philosophy.
Fifthly, thus dichotomy does not contradict trichotomy, but as a rule the 
latter is included in the former or is a particular case of it.
Sixthly, the tripartite structure of the spiritual part of man, including (1) 
soul, (2) intellect (spirit) and (3) word (logos), is considered an image of the 
three Hypostases of the Holy Trinity.
78Mansi. T. 16. Col. 166; Enchiridion symbolorum. N 637.
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Seventhly, any introduction alongside the soul of more spiritual prin-
ciples in man, as was done by the Gnostics, Manicheans, and some par-
ticular theologians, such as Apollinaris, Didymus, and Marius Victorinus, 
is considered non-Christian and false.
These basic principles of Christian anthropology were subsequently 
adopted by medieval Scholastic and Byzantine philosophy and in some 
degree by modern philosophy as well―but that subject goes beyond the 
scope of the present paper.
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